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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Christopher Eric Griffin, Jr., appeals from his judgment of conviction entered upon his
conditional plea to attempted arson in the third degree. He asserts that the district court erred by
denying his pretrial motions.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Griffin was charged with arson in the third degree and attempted arson in the third
degree, which was subsequently amended to two counts of attempted arson in the third degree.
(R., pp.68, 210.) The State alleged in Count I that on June 14, 2017, Mr. Griffin attempted to
commit the crime of arson by lighting a device and causing a small explosion on the property of
the Bannock County Courthouse. (R., p.211.) The State alleged in Count II that on June 15,
2017, Mr. Griffin attempted to commit the crime of arson by filling a beer bottle with gasoline.
(R., p.211.)
Prior to trial, Mr. Griffin filed a "motion for struck jury" pursuant to LC. §§ 2-201-206
and Idaho Criminal Rule 24, "on the grounds and for the reasons that the struck jury process is
the method and manner outlined in the law and criminal rules." (R., p.107.) Several days before
jury selection, Mr. Griffin filed a motion to bifurcate the charges "on the grounds of unfair
prejudice to the Defendant if both charges are tried before the same jury." (R., p.397.) On the
morning of jury selection, the court heard a number of motions filed by Mr. Griffin. First, the
court heard the motion to bifurcate. (8/13/18 Tr., p.5, Ls.16-22.) The court then heard the
motion for a struck jury.

(8/13/18 Tr., p.7, Ls.2-3.)

The State then moved to exclude

Mr. Griffin's proposed expert witness testimony "in regards to fire; about burning,
combustibility, things of that nature. Again, all I have to prove is the intent, not an actual
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burning."

(8/13/18 Tr., p.13, L.23 - p.14, L.2.)

Counsel for Mr. Griffin argued that the

testimony was relevant to a defense of impossibility, "because you can't have an attempt to
commit a crime that cannot be committed." (8/13/18 Tr., p.15, Ls.1-2.)
After the court denied Mr. Griffin's motions and granted the State's motion, Mr. Griffin
entered into a conditional plea "subject to [the] right to appeal the court's rulings on the
evidentiary issues and the defense that the court has now stricken from the case." (8/13/18
Tr., p.28, Ls.20-24.) He pleaded guilty to one count of attempted arson in the third degree and
the district court imposed a sentence of five years, with three years fixed, and the court
suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Griffin on probation. (R. p.450.) Mr. Griffin appealed.
(R., p.454.) He asserts that the district court erred by denying his pretrial motions.
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Griffin's motion for a struckjury?

II.

Did the district court err by excluding Mr. Griffin's proposed expert testimony when it
determined that impossibility was not a defense to an attempt crime?

III.

Did the district court err by denying the motion to bifurcate the charges?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Griffin's Motion For A Struck Jury
Mr. Griffin filed a "motion for struck jury" pursuant to LC. §§ 2-201-206 and Idaho
Criminal Rule 24, "on the grounds and for the reasons that the struck jury process is the method
and manner outlined in the law and criminal rules." (R., p.107.) At the hearing, counsel for
Mr. Griffin stated, "I believe the process the court intends to use is a violation of the statute and
the rules regarding selection of the jury. [It] requires the selection of a broad pool, which is the
initial 60, and then the struck jury is drawn from them. I think that's the procedure. I think any
other play is in violation of those requirements." (8/13/18 Tr., p.7, Ls.5-9.) The court denied the
motion:
This motion has been made before by Mr. Reynolds in virtually every jury trial
I've ever had with him. It's been on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court once
before. They declined to rule on it.
It's a method - I think it's a modified struck jury system. I think it does comply
with the constitution, the rules, and the statutes. And it's a practice used by
multiple district judges in the State ofldaho.
The motion is denied.
(8/13/18 Tr., p.7, Ls.16-24.) Mindful of the applicable statutes and court rules, Mr. Griffin
submits that the district court erred by denying the motion.
Mr. Griffin acknowledges that the record does not disclose exactly what system the
district court was going to employ.

Mr. Griffin based his motion on LC. §§ 2-201-206.

(R., p.107.) Section 2-201 is the title of the act. LC. § 2-201. Section 2-202 provides that it is
the policy of the State that all person selected for jury service be selected at random and from a
fair cross section of the population of the area served by the court. LC. § 2-202. Section 2-203
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provides that discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national ongm, or
economic status is prohibited. LC. § 2-203. Section 2-204 provides the definitions for certain
terms of the statute.

It provides that a "jury selection system" is any "physical device or

automated system for the management of the names or identifying numbers of prospective
jurors" and that a "prospective jury panel" is "the list of names or identifying of prospective
jurors drawn at random from the master jury list." LC. § 2-204. Section 2-205 creates a jury
commission in each county.

LC. § 2-205.

Section 2-206 requires the jury commission to

compile and maintain a master jury list. LC. § 2-206. Mr. Griffm acknowledges that these
statutes do not require or mention the use of a struck jury.
Idaho Criminal Rule 24 does mention struck juries. See LC.R. 24(f). It provides:
Use of a Struck Jury. The court may cause a panel of jurors to be questioned and
passed for cause in a number equal to the number of jurors and alternates required
for the final jury and an additional number equal to the number of peremptory
challenges of the parties. Prospective jurors when chosen must be seated in a
manner so as to be numbered with the lower numbered jurors constituting the
initial panel and alternate jurors, and the subsequent numbered jurors becoming
the replacement jurors if any of the jurors of the original panel are removed by a
peremptory challenge.

I.C.R. 24(f)(emphasis added). Mr. Griffin acknowledges that the court rules provides that the
court "may" use a struck jury system, not that the court "shall" use such a system.

See

Walborn v. Walborn, 120 Idaho 494, 500-01 (1991) ("Our cases have held that the use of the

word 'may' rather than the word 'shall' denotes discretion.")

Mindful of this distinction,

Mr. Griffin submits that the district court erred by denying his motion for a struck jury.
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II.
The District Court Erred By Granting the State's Motion To Exclude Mr. Griffin's Expert
Witness By Holding That Impossibility Is Not A Defense To An Attempt Crime
The State moved to exclude Mr. Griffin's proposed expert witness testimony "in regards
to fire; about burning, combustibility, things of that nature. Again, all I have to prove is the
intent, not an actual burning." (8/13/18 Tr., p.13, L.23 - p.14, L.2.) Counsel for Mr. Griffin
argued that the testimony was relevant to a defense of impossibility, "because you can't have an
attempt to commit a crime that cannot be committed." (8/13/18 Tr., p.15, Ls.1-2.) Counsel
elaborated "you have to establish through the testimony that cement, which is what the defendant
said he was going to do, smash it on the ground, was a material that could be the subject of an
arson. That is, can it be damaged? Can there be a fire?" (8/13/18 Tr., p.15, L.24 - p.16, L.4.)
Based on the case law from the Court of Appeals, the district court held that impossibility was
not a defense to the charges of attempted arson and therefore granted the state's motion.
(8/13/18 Tr., p.22, Ls.1-12.)
The district court based its decision on State v. Curtiss, 138 Idaho 466 (Ct. App. 2002)
and State v. Glass, 139 Idaho 815 (Ct. App. 2003). In Curtiss, the Court of Appeals held,
In this Court's view, Idaho's attempt statute, I.C. § 18-306, encompasses both the
definition and the punishment for the crime of attempt. In that section, the Idaho
legislature has specifically provided for the punishment of individuals who, like
Curtiss, intend to commit a crime, act beyond mere preparation to commit the
crime, but fail. The statute provides no exception for those who intend to commit
a crime but fail because they were unaware of some fact that would have
prevented them from completing the intended crime. That it might be legally or
factually impossible for an individual to ultimately consummate the
underlying crime itself is irrelevant to the analysis.

Curtiss, 138 Idaho at 469 (emphasis added). A year later, in Glass, the court reiterated, "factual
or legal impossibility for the defendant to commit the intended crime [are] not relevant to a
determination of the defendant's guilt of attempt." Glass, 139 Idaho at 818.
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Mindful of the fact that the Court of Appeals has held that neither factual nor legal
impossibility is a defense to the crime of intent, Mr. Griffin submits that the district court erred
by granting the State's motion.

III.
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Griffin's Motion To Bifurcate The Charges
Several days prior to trial, Mr. Griffin filed a motion to bifurcate the charges "on the
grounds of unfair prejudice to the Defendant if both charges are tried before the same jury."
(R., p.397.) At the hearing, Mr. Griffin made the following argument: "The basis of the motion
is the prejudicial impact of having both of those charges tried in front of the same jury. It's our
fear that hearing the evidence as related to one date will overlap and create a presumption of
guilt against Mr. Griffin with regard to the second charge." (8/13/18 Tr., p.5, Ls.16-25.) The
district court noted that the case had been pending for over a year with two charges in it and
asked "how come I'm hearing about this for the first time today?" (8/13/18 Tr., p.5, Ls.23-25.)
Counsel responded, "because that's the tactic I chose to pursue." (8/13/18 Tr., p.6, Ls.1-2.)
The State responded, stating that the charges should remain together for the purposes of
judicial economy, because "we'll be using the same witnesses throughout. In fact, it's the exact
same gas station attendant, the same detective, all of those things." (8/13/18 Tr., p.6, Ls.6-10.)
The distort court ruled, "I've considered both the prejudicial effect and the issues of judicial
economy. There's always a potential for prejudicial effect if there's two charges in a case. I'm
going to instruct the jury properly, and they're not going to be prejudiced. So the motion is
denied." (8/13/18 Tr., p.6, Ls.20-25.) Mr. Griffin submits that the district court abused its
discretion.
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Idaho Criminal Rule 13 provides that the district court may order two or more
informations to be tried together if the offenses could have been joined in a single information.
I. C.R. 13. Two or more offenses may be charged in the same information if the offenses, "are
based on the same act or transaction or on two (2) or more acts or transactions connected
together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan." I.C.R. 8(a). In State v. OrellanaCastro, 158 Idaho 757 (2015), the Idaho Supreme Court held that the "common scheme or plan"

standard from I.R.E. 404(b) applied to joinder issues. In this case, however, Mr. Griffin never
contested whether the two charges were part of a common plan or scheme; he only argued unfair
prejudice.
Concerning motions to sever, I.C.R. 14 provides:
If it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or

of defendants in a complaint, indictment or information, the court may order the
state to elect between counts, grant separate trials of counts, grant a severance of
defendants, or provide whatever other relief justice requires. In ruling on a motion
by a defendant for severance the court may order the attorney for the state to
deliver to the court for inspection in camera any statements or confessions made
by the defendants that the state intends to introduce in evidence at the trial.
A district court's decision under I.C.R. 14 is reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion
standard. State v. Abel, 104 Idaho 865, 867 (1983). This Court conducts a four-part inquiry to
determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion. The court examines whether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries
of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise ofreason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life,
163 Idaho 856, 873 (2018). Mr. Griffin submits that the district court failed to reach its decision
through an exercise of reason.
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In Abel, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that there were three sources of prejudice
that may justify the granting of a severance: (1) the jury may the jury may confuse and cumulate
the evidence, and convict the defendant of one or both crimes when it would not convict him of
either if it could keep the evidence properly segregated; (2) the defendant may be confounded in
presenting defenses, as where he desires to assert his privilege against self-incrimination with
respect to one crime but not the other; or (3) the jury may conclude that the defendant is guilty of
one crime and then find him guilty of the other because of his criminal disposition. Id. at 86768.
In this case, Mr. Griffin identified the third source of prejudice. (R., p.397.) In this case,
the district court ruled: "I've considered both the prejudicial effect and the issues of judicial
economy. There's always a potential for prejudicial effect if there's two charges in a case. I'm
going to instruct the jury properly, and they're not going to be prejudiced. So the motion is
denied." (8/13/18 Tr., p.6, Ls.20-25.)
As noted above, Mr. Griffin did not challenge whether this actions were part of a
common plan or scheme, and he did not contest the State's assertion that the same witnesses
would be used to establish the evidence of both charges. He asserted, "It's our fear that hearing
the evidence as related to one date will overlap and create a presumption of guilt against
Mr. Griffin with regard to the second charge." (8/13/18 Tr., p.5, Ls.16-25.) Mr. Griffin submits
that the district court's offer of a curative instruction was inadequate and thus not the result of an
exercise of reason. The Court of Appeals has acknowledged that in close cases, "a corrective
instruction, even one that is forceful, might be insufficient to cure the prejudicial effect" of
unfairly prejudicial evidence. See State v. Keyes, 150 Idaho 543, 545 (Ct. App. 2011). Thus,
while the district court considered the prejudicial effect and judicial economy in this case,
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Mr. Griffin submits that the prejudice would not be cured by an instruction and that there was
still a danger that evidence related to one charge would overlap create a presumption of guilt
with regard to the second charge.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Griffin requests that the district court's decisions be vacated, his conviction be
vacated, and his case be remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 26 th day of July, 2019.

/s/ Justin M. Curtis
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26 th day of July, 2019, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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